jeremy
00e0cc42cf
- /photo/gallery: D-pad grid, OK opens full screen, arrows browse, Back returns - 400px gallery tiles cached per photo (sync + uploads) - com.dayline.photos 1.1: launcher tile opens the gallery, takes remote input, Back steps through WebView history; screensaver unchanged - slideshow interval 20s -> 15s (live settings) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E9NnVEico3WvFxLyjy1iW3
360 lines
63 KiB
Markdown
360 lines
63 KiB
Markdown
# CLAUDE.md
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This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
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## Repository Overview
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This repository manages a **homelab infrastructure** with self-hosted services running across 3 nodes using **standalone Docker Compose** on all nodes. (Docker Swarm was fully dismantled on 2026-04-01.)
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### Cluster Architecture
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**Nodes:**
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- **hf-pdocker-01** (192.168.86.192) - Core infrastructure + Frigate NVR - **RESTORED (2026-03-08)**
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- **hf-pdocker-02** (192.168.86.100) - Dev tools, utilities
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- **bart** (192.168.86.167) - Media stack, OpenVAS
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**Synology NAS** (192.168.86.30) - Centralized NFS storage for all service data
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**Access:** Username `glyptic`, password `&Rip8a115` (has sudo access on all nodes)
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### Service Distribution
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```
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hf-pdocker-01 (23GB RAM, i7-7700T, NVMe, HD 630 GPU) -- RESTORED (2026-03-08, hardware repaired)
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├── [COMPOSE] Frigate NVR (:5000) -- Coral USB TPU (edgetpu), ~11ms inference, 13 cameras active
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├── [COMPOSE] Frigate-Notify v2 (:5199) -- MQTT->AI->Matrix notifications
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├── [COMPOSE] clip-service (:5200) -- **RUNNING, and actively used.** CORRECTED 2026-09-21: the 2026-07-13 decommission note below was wrong for the current deployment — it was redeployed and the *live* `frigate-notify/docker-compose.yml` sets `CLIP_SERVICE_URL=http://localhost:5200`, with live `app/recognition.py` calling `/embed`. ~1.2GB RSS. **Do not remove without first rewiring frigate-notify's recognition pipeline.**
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├── [COMPOSE] Home Assistant (:8123)
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├── [COMPOSE] ESPHome (:6052) -- manages **Pool Value Controls** (ESP8266 at static **192.168.86.6**, drives pool pumps/valves; only ESPHome device registered in HA). Also polelightpond (.14) and living_room_lights (.153) configs, NOT in HA. See Known Issue #39.
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├── [COMPOSE] Mosquitto (:1883, :8883)
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├── [COMPOSE] Synapse/Matrix (:8008) + wellknown (:8010) + synapse-db (**postgres:16-alpine, LOCAL /var/lib/synapse-db, C collation**) -- Synapse data on LOCAL /var/lib/synapse. Migrated SQLite->PostgreSQL 2026-08-20 (required by syn2mas). **Auth is delegated to MAS** -- Synapse no longer serves /login.
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├── [COMPOSE] **MAS / Matrix Authentication Service (:8020 web, :8021 health) + mas-db (postgres:16-alpine, LOCAL /var/lib/mas-db)** -- OAuth2/OIDC provider for Matrix. Public: auth.hobbs.farm. Deployed 2026-08-20 to enable QR sign-in (MSC4108). QR sign-in **verified working end-to-end 2026-08-20**. **Every Matrix login now depends on this service.**
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├── [COMPOSE] Guacamole (:8199) + guacd + guacamole-db (mysql, LOCAL /var/lib/guacamole-db)
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├── [COMPOSE] AI Agents (margaret:18790, spirit:18795 [infra ops]) -- **OpenClaw 2026.7.1-2, images PINNED via Dockerfile ARG** (`compose/hf-pdocker-01/ai-agents/{margaret,spirit}/Dockerfile`). Both primary `anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6`, fallback `google/gemini-2.5-flash`.
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├── [COMPOSE] Traefik (reverse proxy, ports 80/443/8090) -- `traefik:v3.7` (3.7.16, bumped from v3.6 2026-10-26; 3.7 migration notes are k8s-only for us)
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├── [REMOVED] AdGuard Home -- decommissioned 2026-07-13 (conf dir had been empty since 2026-05-17, DNS engine never ran, LAN uses router DNS). Ports 53/3000 freed on .192.
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├── [COMPOSE] Monitoring (Grafana :3001, Prometheus :9095, Alertmanager :9093, InfluxDB :8086, Blackbox :9115, matrix-receiver :9094)
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├── [COMPOSE] Farm Manager API (:8888) -- dashboard + API server
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├── [COMPOSE] Farm Agent (:8889)
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├── [COMPOSE] Rongorongo decipherment engine -- 2 containers (rongorongo-web :8181, rongorongo-api). Server-synced state at /mnt/docker-data/configs/rongorongo/data. Traefik basicAuth on rongorongo.hobbs.farm.
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├── [COMPOSE] LinkedStorm (:8300 pipeline, :8310 api, cron no-port) -- whole-home audio assistant. VAD+Whisper STT+speaker-ID. Deployed 2026-05-28. Public: linkedstorm.hobbs.farm -> :8310.
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├── [REMOVED] VoiceCoach -- moved to GPU machine (192.168.86.150) 2026-04-04
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├── [COMPOSE] **Onyx (RAG/search) -- 10 containers, `/mnt/docker-data/compose/hf-pdocker-01/onyx`.** NOT decommissioned (the bart entry below refers to an older, separate deployment). Public: **onyx.hobbs.farm** -> nginx :3005. Custom build: `gitea_patch.py` + `unstructured_patch.py` index Gitea (`git.hobbs.farm/api/v1`) and call unstructured-api on .100:8000. LLM -> `192.168.86.150:18020/v1` (`qwen3.8-27b`) — **dead while .150 is down.** `onyx-opensearch-1` **stopped 2026-09-21** (`ENABLE_OPENSEARCH_INDEXING_FOR_ONYX=false`, held no Onyx data, nothing `depends_on` it; freed ~1.1GB). **2026-10-10: it came back on its own after .192's crash/reboot (1.5GB) — now stopped, `restart=no`, and gated behind compose `profiles: ["opensearch"]` so neither reboots nor `compose up` revive it.** Restart with `docker compose --profile opensearch up -d opensearch` if the flag is ever flipped.
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├── [COMPOSE] hermes -- **moved here from .150** (host network, `/mnt/docker-data/compose/hf-pdocker-01/hermes`, pinned `v2026.8.18`). Points at `http://192.168.86.150:18020/v1` model `qwen3.8-27b`; that endpoint is **dead**, so every call burns 200s x3 retries and fails. Note this is a different host:port than the `.150:8081` llamacpp setup documented in the GPU Machine section.
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├── [COMPOSE] litellm (:4000?) + litellm-db -- LLM proxy (see Known Issue #15)
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├── [COMPOSE] synapse-admin -- Synapse admin UI
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├── [COMPOSE] Node-exporter (:9100) -- standalone with pid:host, **v1.12.1** (was v1.7.0 from 2023 until 2026-10-26)
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├── [COMPOSE] Telegraf -- metrics collection to InfluxDB
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├── [CRON] sync-frigate-to-nas (daily 2am), cleanup-frigate-media (weekly Sun 3am), restart-frigate (4x daily 4am/10am/4pm/10pm, log ~/frigate-restart.log)
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├── 5TB USB disk at /mnt/frigate-recordings (Frigate recordings storage)
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bart (15GB RAM, i5-4570T, HDD)
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├── [COMPOSE] Media Stack (Jellyfin, Sonarr, Radarr, SABnzbd, NZBHydra2, **Seerr** -- replaced Jellyseerr 2026-10-17, `seerr/seerr:v3.5.1`, config LOCAL /var/lib/seerr) -- Sonarr config on LOCAL /var/lib/sonarr, NZBHydra config on LOCAL /var/lib/nzbhydra (2026-07-13), **Jellyfin config on LOCAL /var/lib/jellyfin (2026-07-19)** -- all moved off NFS after SQLite/lock crashes. **Jellyfin on official STABLE 12.x, pinned to the dated tag `jellyfin/jellyfin:12.3.20261023-013714` (12.3.0, 2026-10-26).** History: ran the 2026060106 unstable build from 2026-07-14 because the DB had been migrated to the v12 schema (10.11.x cannot read it); stable 12.0 shipped 2026-09-08, moved to 12.2 on 2026-10-17, 12.3 on 2026-10-26 (DB backup `/var/lib/jellyfin-backup-20261026-pre123`). **Never go below 12.**
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├── [REMOVED] Onyx -- this *bart* deployment was decommissioned 2026-07-13. **A different, newer Onyx now runs on hf-pdocker-01 (see above) — 'Onyx is gone' is false.**
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├── [REMOVED] OpenVAS -- decommissioned 2026-07-19 per user (containers, volumes incl. PG DB, image removed; ~39GB freed with other cleanup). Compose dir kept for reference. History: pg_upgrade crash-loop (Known Issue #21), DB wiped fresh 2026-07-15.
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├── [COMPOSE] Farm Agent (:8889)
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├── [COMPOSE] Node-exporter (:9100) -- standalone with pid:host, **v1.12.1** (was v1.7.0 from 2023 until 2026-10-26)
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├── [COMPOSE] Telegraf -- metrics collection to InfluxDB
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├── [COMPOSE] Watchtower -- `nickfedor/watchtower` (maintained fork; containrrr is archived), runs **twice daily 04:00 + 16:00** (`WATCHTOWER_SCHEDULE=0 0 4,16 * * *`)
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hf-pdocker-02 (7.6GB RAM, i7-6700T, HDD)
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├── [REMOVED] UniFi OS Server -- the `unifi-os-server` container (ghcr.io/lemker/unifi-os-server, v5.1.15) was decommissioned 2026-10-05. It was a **duplicate/idle** controller -- the real UniFi controller is the **Podman UniFi OS Server on the Windows box (.150)**, which manages all UniFi devices (e.g. `downstairsswitch` US-24-250W at 192.168.86.159, inform `http://192.168.86.150:8080/inform`). Container + image + network removed; ports 11443/8080/3478/etc freed on .100. **Data preserved** at `/var/lib/unifi-os/*` (971M local) + `/mnt/docker-data/configs/unifi-os/persistent` (NAS); compose dir kept for reference. **Only .150 manages UniFi, by design.** **2026-10-26: it was found RUNNING again** (the 10-05 removal never stuck -- journal shows it up again later that same day, then recreated from its compose dir 2026-10-17 21:06Z). Removed again (container, `unifi_default` network, `ghcr.io/lemker/unifi-os-server` + stale `linuxserver/unifi-network-application` images) and the compose file renamed to `docker-compose.yml.decommissioned-20261026` + `DECOMMISSIONED.txt` so a stray `compose up` cannot revive it. Data still preserved.
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├── [COMPOSE] Gitea + gitea-db (PostgreSQL) -- LevelDB queues on LOCAL /var/lib/gitea-queues (2026-07-13, stale NFS lock caused 7,972-restart loop)
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├── [COMPOSE] Semaphore + semaphore-db (MySQL, LOCAL /var/lib/semaphore-db since 2026-07-13)
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├── [COMPOSE] Wiki.js + wikijs-db (PostgreSQL)
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├── [COMPOSE] Vaultwarden, MCPO, Trivy
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├── [COMPOSE] SearXNG (`searxng/searxng:latest`) -- found running 2026-10-26, previously undocumented here
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├── [COMPOSE] unstructured-api (:8000, `downloads.unstructured.io/unstructured-io/unstructured-api:latest`) -- used by Onyx's `unstructured_patch.py` on .192
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├── [REMOVED] Actual Budget -- decommissioned 2026-07-13 (data kept at /mnt/docker-data/configs/actual-budget)
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├── [COMPOSE] n8n + n8n-db (PostgreSQL) -- workflow automation
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├── [COMPOSE] CouchDB (:5984) -- Obsidian LiveSync backend for the Second Brain vault. LAN-only. LOCAL disk (NOT NFS).
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├── [COMPOSE] **Hobbs Family Organizer (:8340)** -- Shield TV family dashboard (calendar/weather/headlines/markets), deployed 2026-11-04, replaces the ChatGPT-Sites-hosted `dayline-tv` page. Next.js 16 / Node 22, image **built locally** (`hobbs-family-organizer:1.3.0` since 2026-11-04 night; `1.0.0`/`1.1.0`/`1.2.0` kept for rollback; Watchtower disabled). **v1.3.0 adds `/photo/gallery`** (remote-driven grid: arrows move, OK opens full screen, ◀ ▶ browse, Back returns; Slideshow button; idle 10 min -> slideshow) and a 400px tile per photo (`<key>.m.jpg`). Slideshow interval set to **15s** (was 20s) per user. **v1.2.0 adds the photo frame `/photo`** (slideshow of Google Photos shared albums, scraped from the share page because Google's Library API lost album access 2025-03-31, + admin uploads; synced every 6h into LOCAL `data/photos/`, ~0.5MB/photo; current album "TV screensaver", 46 photos). Photo health `GET /api/health/photos` = 503 when an album has not synced for 48h. **Shield photo app `com.dayline.photos` v1.1** (2026-11-04, separate APK: launcher tile opens `/photo/gallery` and takes D-pad input, Back steps back through WebView history; screensaver/DreamService loads `/photo`, non-interactive; default URL baked in, override via `files/base_url` with `run-as`). Built on .100 by `compose/hf-pdocker-02/hobbs-organizer/build-photos-apk.sh` (JDK17 container, SDK cached in volume `hobbs-android-sdk`). **Signing key** `/var/lib/hobbs-organizer/apk-signing/` (root 600) + NAS copy `/mnt/docker-data/configs/hobbs-organizer/apk-signing/` -- losing it means uninstall/reinstall for any update. Installed on **both Shields** (.186 canary, then .179 on 2026-11-04 after the user confirmed .186) and set as the screensaver on both (previous on each: `com.google.android.backdrop/.Backdrop`, saved in `~/hobbs-shield/screensaver-before-{186,179}.txt` on .100; rollback = `adb shell settings put secure screensaver_components <that value>`). **v1.1.0 adds `/admin`** (password, LAN-only, manages calendar links with masked display/test/history-revert); settings + scrypt password hash live in LOCAL `/var/lib/hobbs-organizer/data` (uid 10001, 700) — calendars now come from `data/settings.json`, the secrets file is only a first-start seed. Inside the container a small front proxy on :3000 stamps the real client IP (Next.js runs on 127.0.0.1:3001) so admin can refuse non-LAN and proxied requests. Password reset: `docker exec -u 10001 hobbs-family-organizer-organizer-1 node container/reset-admin.mjs`. Source = `tv app/Hobbs-Family-Organizer-Self-Hosted-v1.0.0/`; deploy dir `/mnt/docker-data/compose/hf-pdocker-02/hobbs-organizer` (bundle + `compose.override.yaml` + `.env`, repo copy `compose/hf-pdocker-02/hobbs-organizer/`). **Trusted-LAN mode** (empty token, per user). Secrets on LOCAL `/var/lib/hobbs-organizer/secrets/` (root 600 -- NFS root_squash would block start.mjs). Both Shields (.179, .186) run APK v1.4 pointed at it. See memory `hobbs-family-organizer`.
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├── [COMPOSE] Farm Agent (:8889)
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├── [COMPOSE] Node-exporter (:9100) -- standalone with pid:host, **v1.12.1** (was v1.7.0 from 2023 until 2026-10-26)
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├── [COMPOSE] Telegraf -- metrics collection to InfluxDB
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├── [COMPOSE] Watchtower -- `nickfedor/watchtower` (maintained fork; containrrr is archived), runs **twice daily 04:00 + 16:00** (`WATCHTOWER_SCHEDULE=0 0 4,16 * * *`)
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```
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## Working with This Repository
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### Environment Context
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You are working in a **WSL 2 environment** on Windows. Docker is NOT directly available in WSL - all Docker operations must be performed by connecting to the remote nodes via SSH.
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**Critical:** Docker is not available locally in WSL. All Docker operations must be performed by connecting to the remote nodes via SSH.
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### Storage Architecture
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All service data lives on the **Synology NAS** via NFS, mounted at `/mnt/docker-data` on all 3 nodes.
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```
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/mnt/docker-data/ (NAS: 192.168.86.30:/volume1/Docker)
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├── configs/ # Application configs
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├── databases/ # Database data directories
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├── media/ # Frigate recordings
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├── traefik/ # Let's Encrypt certs
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└── compose/ # Standalone compose files per node
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├── hf-pdocker-01/{frigate,frigate-notify,clip-service,matrix,smarthome,guacamole,ai-agents,traefik,adguard}/
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├── hf-pdocker-02/{unifi,gitea,semaphore,wikijs,vaultwarden,actual-budget,mcpo,trivy,watchtower}/
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└── bart/{media,openvas,watchtower}/
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```
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**hf-pdocker-02 fixed 2026-11-04 after the 11-03 power event** (dockerd was dead 27h: stale Swarm membership made it fatal-exit when .192:2377 was unreachable, and `/mnt/docker-data` had not mounted): `docker swarm leave --force` done (**side effect: it wiped Docker's embedded-DNS container-name records, so `wikijs-db`/`gitea-db`/… stopped resolving even for new containers -- external DNS was fine, existing DB pools kept working, new connections failed. Fixed by restarting all 18 containers DBs-first. When doing bart: restart its containers or dockerd right after `swarm leave`**), and the `/mnt/docker-data` fstab line now has `nofail,x-systemd.after=network-online.target,x-systemd.mount-timeout=60s` (backup `/etc/fstab.bak-20261104-nfs-nofail`). Its other NAS lines (`/mnt/infrastructure`, `/mnt/NAS` cifs, `/data/media`, `/mnt/nas-media`) still lack it. **bart fixed the same way 2026-11-04** (user-approved): `docker swarm leave`, then `systemctl restart docker` straight away (every bart container is `unless-stopped`, so this rebuilds embedded DNS in one step -- verified all names resolve on `media_default`), and its `/mnt/docker-data` fstab line got the same `nofail,...` options (backup `/etc/fstab.bak-20261104-nfs-nofail`). bart's other NAS lines (`/data/media`, `/mnt/infrastructure`, `/mnt/nas-media`, the `/mnt/frigate-storage` cifs line -- which has the node password in plaintext) were left alone: `nofail` on the media mounts would let Jellyfin/Sonarr/Radarr start against empty dirs. The stale bart/.100 entries were `docker node rm`'d on .192, which is now a **single-node swarm of itself** (harmless: it is the manager, so it never blocks at boot; `docker swarm leave --force` there is optional cleanup).
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**NFS mount (all nodes):** `192.168.86.30:/volume1/Docker /mnt/docker-data nfs rw,soft,timeo=300,intr,_netdev,nfsvers=3,nofail,x-systemd.after=network-online.target,x-systemd.mount-timeout=60s 0 0`
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**Note (hf-pdocker-01):** Both NFS mounts hardened with `nofail,x-systemd.after=network-online.target,x-systemd.mount-timeout=60s` on 2026-05-20 to prevent boot-time race (network not up when NFS tried to mount, cascading ~10 container failures).
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**NFS + Databases:** Database containers on NFS require `user: "1024:100"` to avoid `chown` failures from NFS root_squash. UID 1024 is the NAS anonymous user.
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### Repository File Structure
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```
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stacks/ # LEGACY Swarm stack definitions (Swarm dismantled 2026-04-01, kept for reference)
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compose/ # Standalone Compose definitions (deployed per-node)
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├── hf-pdocker-01/ # Core infrastructure + Frigate
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├── hf-pdocker-02/ # Dev tools & utilities
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│ ├── {service}/docker-compose.yml
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│ └── {service}/.env
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└── bart/ # Media stack & OpenVAS
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```
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### Deployment Workflow
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**All services (compose/):**
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1. Edit compose file in `compose/{node}/{service}/docker-compose.yml`
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2. SCP to NAS path or node, then: `cd /mnt/docker-data/compose/{node}/{service} && docker compose up -d`
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### Service Architecture Patterns
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**Network Patterns:**
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- **Compose services**: Bridge networks for service isolation
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- **Public services** (Traefik): Traefik labels + dynamic config files in `/mnt/docker-data/traefik/dynamic/`
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**Database Patterns:**
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- PostgreSQL: `postgres:15-alpine` or `postgres:16-alpine`
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- MySQL: `mysql:8.0` (Guacamole, Semaphore)
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- MongoDB: `mongo:7.0` (Unifi)
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- **Always** add `com.centurylinklabs.watchtower.enable=false` label
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- **Always** add `user: "1024:100"` for NFS-backed database volumes
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**Volume Patterns:**
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- Application data: `/mnt/docker-data/configs/{service-name}/`
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- Database data: `/mnt/docker-data/databases/{service-name}-db/`
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- Traefik certs: `/mnt/docker-data/traefik/letsencrypt/`
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## Key Services & Access
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### Public Services (via Traefik on hf-pdocker-01)
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- Matrix: `mess.hobbs.farm`
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- Guacamole: `solo.hobbs.farm`
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- Home Assistant: `yoda.hobbs.farm`
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- Vaultwarden: `vault.hobbs.farm`
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- Gitea: `git.hobbs.farm`
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- FRIDAY Voice: `coach.hobbs.farm` — **DECOMMISSIONED 2026-08-26; `coach.hobbs.farm` returns 404, which is EXPECTED, not an outage.** CORRECTED 2026-09-21: the "UP as of 2026-08-20" text previously here was overtaken by events. The live Prometheus config records the `voicecoach` teardown (2026-08-24) and the FRIDAY Voice + speaches teardown (2026-08-26) — routing and monitoring sides done, with "container/volume teardown on .150 still pending manual action next Windows boot". The 6-container `voicecoach` project is indeed gone from .192 (verified 2026-09-21). Its `.150` images/volumes may still exist. See memory `friday-voice`.
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- MAS (Matrix auth): `auth.hobbs.farm` -- OAuth2/OIDC issuer. **If this is down, nobody can log into Matrix** (existing tokens keep working).
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- Onyx (RAG/search): `onyx.hobbs.farm` -- **self-registration is LAN-only** (Traefik `onyx-register-lockdown` router). See Known Issue #34.
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- Rongorongo: `rongorongo.hobbs.farm`
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- LinkedStorm: `linkedstorm.hobbs.farm`
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### Internal Services by Node
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**hf-pdocker-01 (192.168.86.192):**
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- Frigate: :5000
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- Frigate Alerts (v2): :5199 (web UI + REST API)
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- Home Assistant: :8123
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- ESPHome: :6052
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- Mosquitto: :1883
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- Matrix/Synapse: :8008
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- MAS: :8020 (web/oauth/compat), :8021 (health only -- /health is NOT on :8020)
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- Well-known (Matrix federation): :8010
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- Guacamole: :8199
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- Traefik Dashboard: :8090 (HTTP: :80, HTTPS: :443)
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- Grafana: :3001
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- Prometheus: :9095
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- Alertmanager: :9093
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- InfluxDB: :8086
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- Blackbox Exporter: :9115
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- matrix-alertmanager-receiver: :9094
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- AI Agents (margaret :18790, spirit :18795 [infra ops — monitors #notifications, auto-remediates alerts]) -- LAN-accessible (bind=lan, 0.0.0.0). OpenClaw **2026.7.1-2** (upgraded 2026-08-20 from 2026.5.27). Matrix: `@margaret:hobbs.farm` / `@spirit:hobbs.farm`, token auth against `http://192.168.86.192:8008`, encryption off, `requireMention: false`. Rollback images kept as `margaret-openclaw:rollback-2026.5.27` / `spirit-ops:rollback-2026.5.27`.
|
||
- Onyx: :3005 (onyx-nginx). Public onyx.hobbs.farm. `onyx-opensearch-1` deliberately stopped 2026-09-21.
|
||
- hermes: no published port (host network) -- see service tree; its LLM endpoint is currently dead.
|
||
- Farm Manager: :8888 (dashboard + API)
|
||
- Farm Agent: :8889
|
||
- Rongorongo: :8181 (rongorongo-web nginx; reverse-proxies /api/* to rongorongo-api Flask backend on the internal `rongorongo` bridge net). State + images at /mnt/docker-data/configs/rongorongo/data/. Public URL gated by Traefik basicAuth (creds in Vaultwarden).
|
||
- LinkedStorm: :8300 (pipeline/VAD+STT+speaker-ID), :8310 (API/dashboard), cron (no port). Public: linkedstorm.hobbs.farm -> :8310. Source: /opt/linkedstorm (rsync from WSL). Data: /mnt/docker-data/configs/linkedstorm/. STT via Speaches GPU machine :8000, LLM via Ollama :11434 (qwen2.5:14b).
|
||
- ~~VoiceCoach~~ -- replaced by FRIDAY Voice on .150 (see GPU Machine section + memory `friday-voice`). **CORRECTION 2026-08-20: the teardown claimed below never actually happened.** All 6 containers of compose project `voicecoach` (`voicecoach-web` :8085, `-pipecat`, `-speaches`, `-speechbrain`, `-openclaw` :3100, `-livekit` :7880-7881 + 50000-50100/udp) are **running on .192, up since ~2026-08-06**. Earlier text said both projects were `docker compose down`'d on 2026-08-05; that is false for `voicecoach` (`voicecoach-v2` is genuinely gone). ~1GB RAM. `voicecoach-openclaw` was upgraded to OpenClaw 2026.7.1-2 on 2026-08-20 via `docker compose up -d --no-deps voicecoach-openclaw` (single service only — does not resurrect anything, the rest were already up). Its model is `ollama-local/qwen2.5:14b` at the **dead** `192.168.86.27:11434` with **no fallbacks**, so it cannot serve a turn. **Decide: fix its model chain or actually tear the stack down.**
|
||
|
||
**hf-pdocker-02 (192.168.86.100):**
|
||
- Farm Agent: :8889
|
||
- ~~UniFi OS Server: :11443~~ -- **REMOVED 2026-10-05** (duplicate controller; see service tree). The UniFi controller lives on **.150 (Podman), UI at https://192.168.86.150:11443, inform :8080**.
|
||
- Gitea: :3003 (web), :2222 (SSH)
|
||
- Semaphore: :3004
|
||
- Wiki.js: :3002
|
||
- Vaultwarden: :26226
|
||
- MCPO: :8001
|
||
- Trivy: :4954
|
||
- CouchDB: :5984 -- Obsidian LiveSync backend. DB `secondbrain`; admin creds in Vaultwarden ("CouchDB - Obsidian LiveSync"). LAN-only (no Traefik route). Data on LOCAL disk `/var/lib/couchdb` (NFS breaks CouchDB file locking). **`local.ini` must be mounted READ-WRITE** -- with `:ro` CouchDB exits 1 and logs nothing. Auth required on everything except `/_up` (left open for the blackbox probe). Vault repo: git.hobbs.farm/jeremy/second-brain (private); vault lives at `C:\Users\Jeremy\second-brain` on the Windows box.
|
||
- Hobbs Family Organizer: :8340 -- Shield TV dashboard, `GET /api/health` (JSON, `calendarConfigurationValid`, `adminConfigured`). Dashboard open on LAN (trusted-LAN mode); `/photo` = photo frame; `/api/health/photos` (503 = album sync stale >48h, **probe this**); `/admin` is password-protected and LAN-only (direct 192.168.86.0/24 only -- anything arriving via a proxy gets 404, so do NOT add a Traefik route expecting admin to work through it). No Traefik route.
|
||
|
||
**bart (192.168.86.167):**
|
||
- Farm Agent: :8889
|
||
- Jellyfin: :8096
|
||
- Sonarr: :8989
|
||
- Radarr: :7878
|
||
- SABnzbd: :8082
|
||
- NZBHydra2: :5076
|
||
- Jellyseerr: :5055
|
||
|
||
**GPU Machine (192.168.86.150, RTX 3090):**
|
||
- **NOTE (2026-07-05):** .150 is actually the user's **Windows workstation** (runs the WSL/Claude Code session), not a headless Linux server. It runs **Docker Desktop** (WSL2 backend, RTX 3090 GPU passthrough working) alongside **UniFi OS Server** (Podman) — **this is the ONE real UniFi controller** (the duplicate container on .100 was removed 2026-10-05). UI https://192.168.86.150:11443, inform http://192.168.86.150:8080. Manages all UniFi devices incl. `downstairsswitch` (US-24-250W, 192.168.86.159; SSH `admin`/node-password). Docker Desktop panics if UniFi/Podman claims `\\.\pipe\docker_engine` first — start Docker Desktop before UniFi OS Server. See memory `docker-desktop-unifi-podman-conflict`.
|
||
- **FRIDAY Voice replaced VoiceCoach (2026-07-05).** VoiceCoach fully decommissioned (v1+v2 removed from hf-pdocker-01; voice.hobbs.farm route removed). See memory `friday-voice`.
|
||
- [COMPOSE] **FRIDAY Voice stack (all on .150 Docker Desktop, via `docker.exe -c desktop-linux`):**
|
||
- **voicecoach-speaches-gpu**: :8000 — GPU Whisper large-v3-turbo (STT) + Kokoro-82M af_nova (TTS), CUDA float16. Compose: `compose/gpu-machine/voicecoach-speaches/`. **REMOVED 2026-08-21 (see the speaches note at the end of this section) — rebuild when voice I/O is wanted again.**
|
||
- **hermes**: **PINNED `nousresearch/hermes-agent:v2026.8.18`** (upgraded 2026-08-20 from v2026.7.1 / v0.18.0 → v0.20.4). FRIDAY's reasoning agent. Settings in named volume `hermes-data`. Compose: `compose/gpu-machine/hermes/`. Was on `:latest` **with Watchtower disabled**, so nothing ever re-pulled it — it sat 7 weeks / 9 releases behind. Note `:latest` on this repo is the same digest as `main` (rolling dev build), so pin a `vYYYY.M.D` tag. Rollback image `nousresearch/hermes-agent:rollback-2026.7.1`; volume backup in volume `hermes-data-backup-20260820` (`hermes-data-20260820.tgz`, 29MB). **Matrix pairing:** hermes denies unknown senders by default — approve with `docker exec hermes hermes pairing approve matrix <CODE>` (`@jeremy:hobbs.farm` approved 2026-08-20; state persists in the volume). **RESOLVED 2026-08-21 by moving off ChatGPT entirely.** Its Codex refresh token had expired (`Could not validate your refresh token`) and, with **no API key set for any provider**, that was the only auth path — both Matrix and `/api/ask` failed. Verified NOT an upgrade regression (the rollback image failed identically on the same volume). Rather than re-auth interactively, hermes was pointed at the **local llamacpp** endpoint: `model.provider=llamacpp`, `model.default=qwen3.8-64k`, `model.base_url=http://192.168.86.150:8081/v1`. No tokens, no TTY, no subscription. Config backups: `/opt/data/config.yaml.bak-20260820-ollama` and `.bak-20260821-llamacpp`. **`hermes model` is interactive-only — use `hermes config set` for non-interactive changes.** hermes also **hard-refuses any model advertising <64K context** ("Choose a model with at least 64K context"), which is why the served model is a 64k build, not 32k.
|
||
- **llamacpp**: :8081 — **the inference backend for hermes as of 2026-08-21.** `ghcr.io/ggml-org/llama.cpp` **pinned by digest** `sha256:995fe9f2...`. Serves `qwen3.8-64k` (alias) from ollama's GGUF blob, mounted read-only. Compose: `compose/gpu-machine/llamacpp/`. Replaced ollama as the server after a same-model/same-context benchmark: **ollama 15.8 tok/s vs llama.cpp 39.7 tok/s (2.4x)**, because `--cache-type-k/v q8_0` halves the KV cache (23.2GB -> 18.6GB) so the model fits the 3090 instead of spilling layers to CPU. Ollama has no KV-quantization knob. The image's own HEALTHCHECK probes :8080 and can never pass here, so it is `disable: true`d — liveness is an external GET of `:8081/health`.
|
||
- **friday-voice**: :8320 — push-to-talk console. Calls speaches (`host.docker.internal:8000`) + hermes (`docker exec hermes hermes -Q` via wrapper). Public: **coach.hobbs.farm** → :8320. Compose: `compose/gpu-machine/friday-voice/`.
|
||
- Ollama: **TWO separate instances on this box, easy to confuse** —
|
||
- **Native Windows** `ollama.exe` v0.32.15, listens on `::11434` -> reachable as **`192.168.86.150:11434`**. Holds `qwen3.8`, `qwen3.8-64k`, `gemma4`. This is the LAN-visible one and the source of the GGUF that llamacpp serves.
|
||
- **Inside WSL** (`/usr/local/bin/ollama serve`, systemd unit, **enabled+autostart**) v0.15.5, relayed to Windows `127.0.0.1:11434` by `wslrelay.exe`. Holds `qwen2.5:14b`, `hf.co/NousResearch/Hermes-4.3-36B-GGUF:Q4_K_M`, `qwen3.6`, `glm-4.7-flash`, `qwen3-coder:30b`, `gpt-oss:20b`, `llama3.1`. **`host.docker.internal:11434` from a Docker Desktop container resolves to THIS one**, not the native one — that cost real debugging time.
|
||
- Both share the one physical 3090. Native ollama env (User scope): `OLLAMA_KEEP_ALIVE=30s`, `OLLAMA_MAX_LOADED_MODELS=1`, `OLLAMA_NUM_PARALLEL=1` — keep-alive was deliberately dropped from `-1` back to `30s` once llamacpp became the server, so ollama stops pinning ~22GB of VRAM. **These are read from the registry only by processes launched fresh (e.g. at login); a process started from an existing shell inherits that shell's env instead.**
|
||
- **speaches (voicecoach-speaches-gpu) REMOVED 2026-08-21** to free ~3.3GB VRAM for the llama.cpp benchmark, per user ("they can be rebuilt later"). **Image and the `voicecoach-speaches_speaches-models` volume were kept**, so rebuild is just `docker compose -f 'C:\Users\Jeremy\projects\docker\compose\gpu-machine\voicecoach-speaches\docker-compose.yml' up -d` with no model re-download. **FRIDAY's voice in/out (STT+TTS) is down until then; the text `/api/ask` path works.** Its compose sets `WHISPER__TTL=-1`, which is why it pinned VRAM permanently — consider a finite TTL on rebuild.
|
||
|
||
### Port Conflict Notes
|
||
|
||
Port conflicts already resolved:
|
||
- Port 8000: Freed (MCPO moved to 8001, Portainer moved elsewhere)
|
||
- Port 3000: freed 2026-07-13 (was AdGuard Home, decommissioned; Gitea remains on 3003)
|
||
- Port 3001: Grafana (Semaphore moved to 3004)
|
||
- Port 5000: Frigate uses host networking (registry container stopped)
|
||
- AI Agent ports re-spaced (2026-03-15): openclaw 2026.3.13 uses gateway+2 and gateway+3 for browser/chrome-relay. Agents spaced 5 apart: margaret=18790, spirit=18795
|
||
|
||
## Critical Configuration Preservation
|
||
|
||
### Encryption Keys & Passwords
|
||
|
||
- Semaphore: `SEMAPHORE_ACCESS_KEY_ENCRYPTION` encrypts sensitive data
|
||
- **Always** check for existing encryption keys before generating new ones
|
||
|
||
### Database Version Matching
|
||
|
||
Match the PostgreSQL/MySQL version to existing data directory format. Check logs for version mismatch errors.
|
||
|
||
## Post-Change Checklist (MANDATORY)
|
||
|
||
After ANY infrastructure change (deploy, remove, reconfigure, add service, change ports, modify Traefik routes), you MUST complete ALL of these before reporting done:
|
||
|
||
1. **CLAUDE.md** — Update service lists, ports, node assignments if changed
|
||
2. **MEMORY.md** — Add/update relevant memory entries
|
||
3. **Prometheus probes** — Add/remove blackbox targets, hot-reload Prometheus
|
||
4. **Wiki** — Launch documentation-keeper agent to update wiki pages (run in background)
|
||
5. **Farm Manager links page** (last audited **2026-10-26**: every link probed; removed both FRIDAY Voice links, added Onyx (public + :3005), Guacamole :8199, Synapse Admin :8080, SearXNG :8888, n8n :5678, CouchDB Fauxton; MCPO -> `/docs`, Trivy -> `/healthz` (API only, no UI); Jellyseerr -> Seerr. Groups live in `/mnt/docker-data/configs/farm-manager/groups.json` -- **update them too when containers are added/renamed**. Previous audit 2026-08-20: dropped dead Clippy/Bob/Aaron links, added FRIDAY Voice + LinkedStorm + Rongorongo and a new `GPU Machine (192.168.86.150)` category; `hermes` intentionally absent — it publishes no ports. Served path is `/app.js`, not `/static/app.js`.) — If a service was added/removed or its URL/port changed: edit the `serverLinks` array in `/opt/farm-manager/server/static/app.js` on hf-pdocker-01, then rebuild + redeploy: `docker build -f /opt/farm-manager/Dockerfile.server -t farm-manager:latest /opt/farm-manager && cd /mnt/docker-data/compose/hf-pdocker-01/farm-manager && docker compose up -d` (links are baked into the image, not mounted)
|
||
|
||
Do NOT wait for the user to ask. Do NOT skip "because the change was small." Every change gets documented.
|
||
|
||
## Common Operations
|
||
|
||
### Deploy/Update a Compose Service
|
||
|
||
1. Edit `compose/{node}/{service}/docker-compose.yml`
|
||
2. SSH to the target node and run:
|
||
```bash
|
||
cd /mnt/docker-data/compose/{node}/{service}
|
||
docker compose up -d
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Troubleshoot
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
# On target node:
|
||
docker compose -f /mnt/docker-data/compose/{node}/{service}/docker-compose.yml logs --tail 100
|
||
docker ps --format "table {{.Names}}\t{{.Status}}"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Check Cluster Health
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
# On each node:
|
||
docker ps # Local containers
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
## Data Management
|
||
|
||
### Storage
|
||
|
||
All persistent data on NAS at `/mnt/docker-data/`:
|
||
- `configs/` - Application configurations
|
||
- `databases/` - Database volumes
|
||
- `media/` - Frigate recordings
|
||
- `traefik/` - SSL certificates
|
||
|
||
### NAS Dependency
|
||
|
||
**Risk**: NAS failure = all services fail (single point of failure)
|
||
- NFS mount uses `soft,timeo=300` for graceful timeout
|
||
- Synology should have "Restart automatically after power failure" enabled
|
||
- Original data backups remain on local `/data/configs/` on hf-pdocker-01
|
||
|
||
## Specialized Agents
|
||
|
||
### vault-credential-manager
|
||
**Use for:** Storing/retrieving credentials from Vaultwarden
|
||
|
||
### documentation-keeper
|
||
**Use for:** Creating/updating documentation in Wiki.js
|
||
|
||
## Known Issues & Workarounds
|
||
|
||
1. **NFS root_squash**: Database containers need `user: "1024:100"` to avoid chown failures on NAS volumes
|
||
2. **Telegraf Docker Input**: Disabled due to Docker socket permission issues across nodes
|
||
3. **Watchtower API Version**: Requires `DOCKER_API_VERSION=1.44`
|
||
4. **InfluxDB Connection**: Telegraf may show timeout errors if InfluxDB is not running
|
||
5. **Frigate cameras**: 192.168.44.0/24 is the **"Camera" VLAN 200** on the Firewalla (gateway 192.168.86.1 / 44.1). Cameras with 44.x IPs MUST sit on Camera-native switch ports. **2026-10-08:** house_north/.51, house_east/.58, house_south/.53, house_west/.52 are wired to downstairsswitch (.159) ports 3/4/18/19 (verified from the switch MAC table 2026-10-11), which are **VLAN 1**, so they can't be reached by routing. They only half-worked because .192's Wi-Fi NIC held a wrong-VLAN 44.x lease. The fix is to make those ports Camera-native (see memory `unifi-estate`). The nodes' `wlp2s0` Wi-Fi NICs must hold **86.x** leases; a 44.x lease there is stale and breaks routing to the real Camera VLAN. **2026-10-10: with the Wi-Fi workaround gone (86.x lease since 10-08), those 4 cameras are now fully DOWN (0 fps, no ping) until the ports are re-profiled.**
|
||
6. **Registry container**: Stopped on hf-pdocker-01 to free port 5000 for Frigate
|
||
7. **systemd-resolved DNSStubListener**: disabled on hf-pdocker-01 and hf-pdocker-02 via `/etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d/nostub.conf` (`DNSStubListener=no`) — originally for AdGuard Home's port 53. AdGuard was decommissioned 2026-07-13; the stub-listener change is harmless and left in place (re-enable only if something needs 127.0.0.53).
|
||
8. **NFS boot-mount race (hf-pdocker-01)**: NFS mounts failed at boot (network not ready in time). Fixed 2026-05-20 by adding `nofail,x-systemd.after=network-online.target,x-systemd.mount-timeout=60s` to both fstab entries. If mounts are missing after reboot: `sudo mount /mnt/docker-data && sudo mount /mnt/infrastructure`.
|
||
9. **Guacamole schema**: App image pinned to `guacamole/guacamole:1.6.0` + `guacd:1.6.0` with Watchtower disabled. DB schema was reset to fresh 1.6.0 on 2026-05-20 (old schema was non-standard). Recreate connections after any DB reset.
|
||
10. **Gitea image**: Pinned to `gitea/gitea:1.26.1` with Watchtower disabled (2026-05-20). Watchtower previously pulled broken `:latest` images causing missing git binary errors.
|
||
11. **Home Assistant reverse proxy**: Config at `/mnt/docker-data/configs/homeassistant/configuration.yaml` (no hyphen). Must have `http: use_x_forwarded_for: true` + `trusted_proxies: [172.16.0.0/12, 127.0.0.1]` or proxied requests return 400.
|
||
12. **hf-pdocker-01 memory pressure (2026-07-05, retrimmed 2026-07-11)**: Node runs hot (~15-18/23GB, chronic swap). Mitigations applied: `vm.swappiness` lowered 60→10 (persisted in `/etc/sysctl.d/99-swappiness.conf`), and VoiceCoach (v1+v2, ~10 containers) removed (replaced by FRIDAY Voice on .150) — **but see correction: the VoiceCoach compose stacks on .192 were only *stopped* in July, not `down`'d, and reappeared (~3GB) on the 2026-08-05 reboot; properly torn down 2026-08-05 (`docker compose down` on `voicecoach` + `voicecoach-v2`), node mem 9.0→6.7GB used.** — **this is WRONG, see 2026-08-20: only `voicecoach-v2` is gone; the 6-container `voicecoach` project is still running on .192.** Frigate is the main consumer. **2026-07-11:** Frigate's built-in AI features (`semantic_search: large`, `face_recognition`, `lpr`, `classification.bird`) were found *enabled* (contradicting the intended baseline) and re-disabled — dropped the embeddings CLIP model ~1.2GB→168MB and cut CPU inference; host mem 18→~9GB, swap 3.9→1.3GB right after. Config `/mnt/docker-data/configs/frigate/config/config.yml` (backup `.bak.20260711-aitrim`). Recognition is instead handled externally by frigate-notify v2 (clip-service was removed 2026-07-13 — frigate-notify's config never referenced it). **2026-07-12 — WHOLE-NODE CRASH:** .192 froze hard (~14:15, sshd/HA/DNS all dead, required hard reboot). Cause: Frigate `memswap_limit` had drifted to **16G** vs `mem_limit` 12G, letting it spill ~4GB into host swap; with the ffmpeg leak pinning it at 12G all day (cgroup OOM every ~45min), the host swap-thrashed to death. **Fix: node compose `memswap_limit: 12G` (= mem_limit) so Frigate can never use host swap** — a hit now trims its own ffmpeg (contained cgroup OOM), not the host. Repo already had 12G; node had drifted (never redeployed). NOTE: recording ffmpeg still leaks ~0.8GB/h atop ~6GB baseline (fills 12G in ~7.5h); twice-daily 4am+4pm restart-frigate cron mitigates but doesn't fully beat it — consider every-6h restart + fixing broken cameras (gate_camera, garage_2). Always keep `memswap_limit == mem_limit` on this node.
|
||
13. **Docker Desktop vs UniFi OS Server pipe conflict (Windows box .150, 2026-07-05)**: Both fight over `\\.\pipe\docker_engine`; Docker Desktop's backend nil-panics ("backend exited before becoming ready") if Podman wins. Fix: let Docker Desktop (auto-starts at login) claim the pipe first, launch UniFi OS Server manually after. Full detail in memory `docker-desktop-unifi-podman-conflict`.
|
||
14. **MySQL InnoDB corruption on NFS**: `semaphore-db` (mysql:8.0 on NFS) hit system-tablespace page corruption and crash-looped 3789× (2026-07-11), same class as the Guacamole-on-NFS issue (#9). Recovered in-place via `--innodb-force-recovery=1` → mysqldump → fresh volume → reimport (DB was empty, no data lost); admin recreated with `semaphore user add`. Any MySQL DB on NFS is at risk — prefer LOCAL storage like guacamole-db. See memory `semaphore-db-nfs-corruption`.
|
||
15. **litellm hangs after DB blip**: litellm does NOT self-recover from a transient `litellm-db` disconnect — it loops on "Prisma DB reconnect failed" forever; needs manual `docker restart litellm`. Its healthcheck was fixed from `curl` (absent from image, permanent false-unhealthy) to a python urllib check (2026-07-11).
|
||
16. **Stale NFS locks after unclean reboot/power loss (2026-07-12 power event)**: NFS file locks held by pre-reboot client identities survive on the Synology and block relocking — gitea crash-looped 7,972× on its LevelDB queue lock, semaphore-db 975× on `ibdata1`, and nzbhydra2 sat unhealthy on its H2 database lock. Fix applied 2026-07-13: lock-prone data moved to LOCAL disk (gitea queues → `/var/lib/gitea-queues`, semaphore-db → `/var/lib/semaphore-db` on .100; sonarr config → `/var/lib/sonarr`, nzbhydra config → `/var/lib/nzbhydra` on bart; jellyfin config → `/var/lib/jellyfin` on bart 2026-07-19 after 60-100s "database is locked" stalls on jellyfin.db caused playback lockups; **synapse data → `/var/lib/synapse` on .192 2026-08-20**, pre-emptively — its 279MB SQLite homeserver.db was on NFS). **Rule: anything holding long-lived file locks (MySQL, SQLite, LevelDB) goes on local disk, never NFS.**
|
||
17. **Synapse rate-limited Alertmanager notifications**: default `rc_message` (0.2 msg/s) made every matrix-alertmanager-receiver send fail with M_LIMIT_EXCEEDED 429 — **no alerts reached Matrix for weeks** while outages accumulated (Onyx down 5 weeks, AdGuard dead 2 months, unnoticed). Fixed 2026-07-13: `rc_message: {per_second: 5, burst_count: 50}` in homeserver.yaml (backup `.bak-20260713-ratelimit`).
|
||
18. **AdGuard Home decommissioned 2026-07-13**: its conf dir had been empty since 2026-05-17 (container ran the first-launch wizard, served no DNS, no backup existed) and the LAN had been using router DNS ever since. Container, data, compose dir, and Prometheus probe all removed; ports 53/3000 freed on .192. LAN DNS = the router.
|
||
19. **Duplicate failover stacks removed from .100 and bart (2026-07-13)**: .100 ran a second monitoring stack (prometheus/grafana/alertmanager/influxdb/blackbox), an idle traefik (shared acme.json with .192 — ACME conflict risk), and a stray guacamole; bart ran a failover guacamole. All removed (~2GB RAM reclaimed). Compose dirs kept for reference; data volumes untouched.
|
||
20. **UniFi OS Server probe port** (historical): the `unifi-os-server` container on .100 served HTTPS on host port **11443** (container 443), not 8443. **That container was removed 2026-10-05** (duplicate controller) — the sole UniFi controller is now the Podman instance on **.150** (UI https://192.168.86.150:11443, inform :8080). The live Prometheus config **did** carry a blackbox probe for `https://192.168.86.100:11443` (line 132) — it was **removed 2026-10-06** (backup `prometheus.yml.bak-20261006-unifi-probe-remove`) and Prometheus hot-reloaded, since nothing listens there now. **No probe added for the .150 controller** because that box is a workstation that is sometimes off (it would false-alarm); the switch itself (192.168.86.159) could be ICMP-probed instead if device-down alerting is wanted. (Note: the `UnifiDeviceDown` alert in `alerts.yml` keys on `unifi_device_up`, which needs a `unifi-exporter` that is NOT deployed — the metric doesn't exist, so that rule is inert, not firing.)
|
||
21. **OpenVAS pg_upgrade loop saturated bart's HDD (2026-07-15)**: `immauss/openvas:latest` looped on the PG 13→15 auto-upgrade for ~21h (158 restarts) — each cycle re-copied the 21GB DB, pinning sda at ~90% util/40% iowait and making Jellyfin (same disk) hang. The upgrade itself succeeded every time but the final `mv /data/database /data/database_13_old` failed with "Device or resource busy" because the openvas-db volume is mounted **at** `/data/database` (can't rename a mountpoint). Fixed by wiping the DB (`docker volume rm openvas_openvas-db`) and letting it initdb fresh on PG15 — scan history lost, feeds re-synced. **On the next major PG bump this will recur** unless the upgrade is done out-of-band (content-level swap) or the volume is remounted at `/data`. General rule: a service "hanging" on bart usually means another container is eating the single HDD — check `iostat -x`/`pidstat -d` first. **OpenVAS fully decommissioned 2026-07-19** (moot unless redeployed).
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22. **Jellyfin SQLite-on-NFS lockups (fixed 2026-07-19)**: jellyfin.db (WAL mode) on `/mnt/docker-data/configs/jellyfin` hit escalating `SQLite Error 5: 'database is locked'` (22→33→125/day), DB commands blocking 60-102s → healthcheck flaps + playback stalls ("Unexpected end of request content" on /Sessions/Playing/Progress). Config moved to LOCAL `/var/lib/jellyfin` (old copy left on NFS as backup). Same class as Known Issue #16.
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23. **Matrix registration was wide open to the internet (fixed 2026-08-20)**: `mess.hobbs.farm` is publicly reachable (Traefik, port 443, federation + client API on :8008) and `homeserver.yaml` had `enable_registration: true` + `enable_registration_without_verification: true` — the registration flow was a bare `m.login.dummy`, i.e. **anyone on the internet could create an account on hobbs.farm with no email, captcha, or token**. No abuse had occurred (all 18 accounts are known/expected; newest legit account was @fry 2026-07-05). Fixed by setting both to `false` and `restrict_public_rooms_to_local_users: true` (was `false`, which published the public room directory to any remote server). Backup: `/var/lib/synapse/homeserver.yaml.bak-20260820-registration`. New accounts are still creatable on the box via `docker exec synapse register_new_matrix_user -k <registration_shared_secret>`.
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24. **Synapse database history (SQLite -> local disk -> PostgreSQL, all 2026-08-20)**: Synapse ran on **SQLite on NFS** while CLAUDE.md claimed it used a `synapse-db` postgres that in fact had **0 tables**. First the data was moved to LOCAL `/var/lib/synapse` and the empty postgres deleted; then, because `syn2mas` **only reads PostgreSQL** ("The migration tool only supports reading from PostgreSQL for the Synapse database as well"), a real `synapse-db` was created and the DB ported with `synapse_port_db` (20 users / 93,888 events / 65 devices, verified identical; 2m35s downtime). The PG database MUST have `LC_COLLATE=C` -- verify with `select datcollate from pg_database where datname='synapse'` (PG16 removed the `SHOW lc_collate` GUC). The old SQLite file is still at `/var/lib/synapse/homeserver.db`, now inert; NFS copy at `/mnt/docker-data/configs/matrix/data` is an older backup -- **never remount either**.
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25. **Synapse upgraded 1.148.0 -> 1.159.0 and moved to the element-hq registry (2026-08-20)**: it had been on `matrixdotorg/synapse:latest`, an **abandoned Docker Hub repo** whose `:latest` froze at 1.148.0 (image built 2026-02-24) — a moving tag that silently stopped moving on a publicly-exposed homeserver. Now pinned to `ghcr.io/element-hq/synapse:v1.159.0` (note the **`v` prefix** — `:1.159.0` without it 404s). Upgrade was clean: schema 93 -> 94, all background updates finished in ~5s, 0 errors, 19 users / 93,884 events intact, memory 112MB/1G. None of the v1.149-v1.159 breaking changes applied to us (MSC3861 removal — unused; `quarantined_media_changes` stream writer — workers only; the rest are Debian/Ubuntu packaging). Pre-upgrade backup: `/var/lib/synapse.bak-20260820-pre1159` (646MB) — delete once you're satisfied. **Pinned on purpose: bump it manually and deliberately, since the last moving tag rotted for 6 months unnoticed.** **2026-10-26: bumped v1.159.0 -> v1.163.2** (schema 94 deltas applied in <1s; config contains none of the options affected by the 1.160-1.163 upgrade notes). pg_dump backups taken first: `/var/lib/upgrade-backups-20261026/{synapse-db,mas-db}.dump` on .192. MAS bumped 1.23.0 -> **1.27.1** at the same time.
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26. **`SYNAPSE_SERVER_NAME` in the matrix compose disagrees with homeserver.yaml**: compose passes `SYNAPSE_SERVER_NAME=mess.hobbs.farm` but the real `server_name` is **`hobbs.farm`** (user IDs are `@user:hobbs.farm`). The env var is only read when the image *generates* a config, so it's inert today — but if `homeserver.yaml` ever went missing, the container would generate a fresh config with the wrong `server_name` AND a new signing key, which would break federation and every existing user ID. Left as-is (changing it has no effect while the config exists); just never let the container auto-generate..
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27. **Matrix auth is delegated to MAS -- Synapse does NOT serve /login any more (2026-08-20)**: with `matrix_authentication_service.enabled: true`, Synapse answers `M_UNRECOGNIZED` on `/_matrix/client/*/login`. The **reverse proxy must route the three compat paths to MAS or nobody can sign in**: `login`, `logout`, `refresh` (verified: MAS returns 200/405 on those and 404 on `register`/`whoami`, which stay on Synapse). Implemented as the `mess-auth-compat` router in `/mnt/docker-data/traefik/dynamic/temp-routes.yml` with explicit `priority: 1000` so it beats the catch-all `mess` router. **Anything that talks to `192.168.86.192:8008` directly bypasses Traefik and therefore cannot log in with a password** -- token-based bots (spirit, frigate, alertbot) are unaffected because they never call /login, but `@clippyauto` (n8n) and `@pluto` historically re-login with a password (17 and 15 accumulated devices). They currently run on migrated tokens; if either ever needs a fresh password login, point it at `https://mess.hobbs.farm` instead of `:8008`.
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28. **MAS image tags are NOT `v`-prefixed** -- `ghcr.io/element-hq/matrix-authentication-service:1.23.0` is correct, `:v1.23.0` does not exist. This is the **opposite** of Synapse (`ghcr.io/element-hq/synapse:v1.159.0`, where `:1.159.0` 404s). The MAS image is also **distroless** -- no shell, so a container healthcheck is impossible; liveness comes from the blackbox probe of `http://192.168.86.192:8021/health`. Note `/health` lives on the internal listener only: `https://auth.hobbs.farm/health` returns 404 by design, so the public probe targets `/.well-known/openid-configuration`.
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29. **MAS config holds unrecoverable signing keys**: `/mnt/docker-data/configs/mas/config.yaml` (mode 640) contains the RSA/EC signing keys and the `matrix.secret` shared with Synapse. Regenerating them invalidates every session. It is **not yet backed up to Vaultwarden** because the vault master password is currently unknown (see memory `vault-master-password-stale`) -- resolve that and store it. Also note `http.issuer`/`public_base` (`https://auth.hobbs.farm/`) are baked into session state; changing the hostname later invalidates sessions.
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30. **OpenClaw agent images were built from `openclaw@latest` and rotted for months (fixed 2026-08-20)**: margaret and spirit sat on **2026.5.27** while upstream was on **2026.7.1-2** — same failure mode as the abandoned `matrixdotorg/synapse:latest` (Known Issue #25). Worse, **the Dockerfiles existed nowhere** — not in the repo, not on any node — and had to be reconstructed from `docker history` layer output. They now live at `compose/hf-pdocker-01/ai-agents/{margaret,spirit}/Dockerfile` (staged on the NAS at `/mnt/docker-data/compose/hf-pdocker-01/ai-agents/`) with `ARG OPENCLAW_VERSION` **pinned**; bump it deliberately. Rebuild: `cd /mnt/docker-data/compose/hf-pdocker-01/ai-agents && docker build -t margaret-openclaw:<ver> -t margaret-openclaw:latest ./margaret` (same for `./spirit` → `spirit-ops`). npm dist-tags to check: `latest`, `extended-stable`, `beta`. **Upgrading migrates the state dir one-way** (JSON sidecars → shared SQLite; originals archived as `*.migrated` under `/mnt/infrastructure/{margaret,spirit}/`), so a rollback to `*:rollback-2026.5.27` also needs those `.migrated` files restored. Config backups: `/mnt/infrastructure/{margaret,spirit}/openclaw.json.bak-20260820-preupgrade`.
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31. **`192.168.86.27` is dead and several configs still point at it (2026-08-20)**: spirit's *primary* model was `vllm-local/qwen` at `192.168.86.27:8001`, so **every** message burned ~12s timing out before failing over to Anthropic (2,913 consecutive primary-model failures). margaret had the same host as a `vllm-local/hermes` provider. Both `vllm-local` provider blocks were deleted; both agents are now `anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6` primary with `google/gemini-2.5-flash` fallback. `voicecoach-openclaw` **still** points at `192.168.86.27:11434` with no fallbacks. **There is no host at .27** — grep any new agent config for it. Related: margaret listed `google/gemini-2.5-flash` as a fallback while defining **no** google provider or auth profile, so it could never have fired; a google provider block (api `google-generative-ai`, key verified against the live models list) was added to match spirit's working shape.
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||
32. **CORRECTED 2026-08-21 — there are TWO ollama instances on .150, which is why the model lists disagreed**: a **native Windows** `ollama.exe` (v0.32.15) on `192.168.86.150:11434` holding only `gemma4` + the new `qwen3.8*`, and one **inside WSL** (v0.15.5, systemd, autostart) relayed to `127.0.0.1:11434`, holding `qwen2.5:14b`, `Hermes-4.3-36B-GGUF`, `qwen3.6`, `qwen3-coder:30b`, `gpt-oss:20b`, `llama3.1`. So the older docs were **right** — those models exist, just in the WSL instance. An earlier note here claiming "only gemma4" was measuring the native one alone. **`host.docker.internal:11434` from a Docker Desktop container hits the WSL instance; the LAN IP hits the native one.** Both share the single 3090, so either can starve the other. spirit's `ollama` provider still advertises a nonexistent `qwen3.5` (harmless, not in its chain). **LinkedStorm on .192 points at `192.168.86.150:11434` for `qwen2.5:14b` — that model is NOT on the native instance, so LinkedStorm's LLM calls are probably 404ing. Still unverified.**
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|
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33. **Docker Desktop on .150 died twice while loading a large model (2026-08-21)**: the WSL2 VM had **no `.wslconfig`**, so it defaulted to 50% of host RAM = **15GB** shared by the Ubuntu distro, the docker-desktop VM and podman-uosserver. Loading llama.cpp's 16.8GB GGUF alongside the running containers **OOM-killed hermes and friday-voice (exit 137)**, and on the first attempt took the whole Docker Desktop backend down — it went `unable to start` -> HTTP 500 on every API call -> engine pipe missing entirely. **Recovery that worked:** kill all `Docker Desktop`/`com.docker` processes, `wsl --terminate docker-desktop`, then start Docker Desktop **before** UniFi OS Server (the pipe-conflict rule in issue #13 still applies — UniFi went down in the crash and had to be restarted after). Mitigation applied: `C:\Users\Jeremy\.wslconfig` now sets `memory=22GB`, `swap=8GB` — **this needs `wsl --shutdown` or a reboot to take effect, and `wsl --shutdown` kills the Claude Code session too**, so it has NOT been applied yet. Until it is, expect OOM churn when a big model loads.
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||
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||
34. **Onyx self-registration was open to the internet (fixed 2026-09-21)**: `onyx.hobbs.farm` is publicly reachable and Onyx runs `AUTH_TYPE=basic` with **no** `REQUIRE_EMAIL_VERIFICATION` and **no** `VALID_EMAIL_DOMAINS` — so `POST /api/auth/register` let anyone on the internet create an account. External scanners were already probing the host (a DigitalOcean IP hit `/` on 2026-09-21). No abuse had occurred: only 2 accounts existed (`glyptic@gmail.com` + Onyx's internal `anonymous@onyx.app`). **Fix: a Traefik router `onyx-register-lockdown` (`priority: 1000`, beats the catch-all `onyx` router) matching `PathPrefix(/api/auth/register)` behind an `ipAllowList` middleware limited to `192.168.86.0/24` + `127.0.0.1/32`.** Verified by temporarily narrowing the range: register returned **403** from a non-allowlisted source while `/api/auth/login` (405) and `/` (200) were unaffected; range then restored. Config `/mnt/docker-data/traefik/dynamic/onyx.yml` (backup `.bak-20260920-195851`). **To add a user: register from the LAN, or widen the `sourceRange`.** Note `VALID_EMAIL_DOMAINS` was rejected as the control because it is domain-level only — `gmail.com` would admit any Gmail user. Same class as Known Issue #23 (open Matrix registration).
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||
35. **The live Prometheus config is `/mnt/docker-data/configs/prometheus/prometheus.yml` — the copy at `compose/hf-pdocker-01/monitoring/prometheus.yml` is STALE and misleading (2026-09-21)**: the compose-dir copy still lists decommissioned targets, including Onyx at the wrong node (`192.168.86.167:3005`, bart) and OpenVAS (`:9392`). Neither is in the live config, so neither was ever probed — grepping the compose copy to answer "is X monitored?" gives the wrong answer. Onyx had **no probe at all** until one was added to the live file on 2026-09-21 (`http://192.168.86.192:3005`, now `probe_success=1`). Backup `prometheus.yml.bak-20260920-*`. The live file is also the better changelog: it records the voicecoach (2026-08-24) and FRIDAY Voice / speaches (2026-08-26) teardowns that CLAUDE.md still described as live.
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||
36. **SSH key auth to hf-pdocker-01 is broken — password only (2026-09-21)**: all of `~/.ssh/id_docker_server`, `id_bart`, `id_nas` are rejected by `192.168.86.192` (`Permission denied (publickey,password)`), while `id_docker_server` still works for `.100` and `id_bart` for bart. Connect with `sshpass -p '&Rip8a115' ssh -o PubkeyAuthentication=no glyptic@192.168.86.192`. **Any key-based automation targeting .192 is silently failing** — check `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` on that node (likely lost when the host was rebuilt/restored).
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||
37. **hf-pdocker-01 hard-hung for ~27h (2026-10-09 13:55 → 2026-10-10 17:08 CDT)**: journal simply stops at 13:55 with no OOM, kernel error, or shutdown record; `sar` at 13:50 showed a healthy box (62% mem, 23% swap, load ~4), and .100/bart stayed up (9d uptime), so it was neither memory exhaustion nor a house-wide power event. Came back on kernel 7.0.0-38 (was -34) after a power cycle. Cause unknown — if it recurs, suspect hardware (this box was repaired 2026-03) and consider enabling persistent `kdump`/`netconsole`. Side effects found on 2026-10-10: `onyx-opensearch-1` revived itself (fixed, see Onyx entry). Also fixed then: `ServiceHighMemory` used `container_memory_usage_bytes`, which counts reclaimable page cache, so clip-service false-alarmed at 94% while really at 64% — rule now uses `container_memory_working_set_bytes` (backup `alerts.yml.bak-20261010-workingset`).
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||
38. **bart shows ~20 nameless `Dead` containers in `docker ps -a`** — orphaned `/var/lib/docker/containers/<id>` dirs for containers whose images Watchtower already deleted. `docker rm` says "No such container". Harmless clutter; clearing them requires stopping dockerd (moving the dirs aside) which restarts the whole media stack, so it was left for a maintenance window.
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||
39. **[RESOLVED 2026-10-11] Static-IP ESPHome boards were invisible behind UniFi Proxy ARP (found 2026-10-10)**: the `ASUS_F0_2G` WLAN has **Proxy ARP on** (`proxy_arp=1` in every AP's `/etc/hostapd/wifi0ap0.cfg`; it also has `ap_isolate=1` and `mcast.enhance=1`). With Proxy ARP, the AP answers ARP for wireless clients **from a table it learns by snooping DHCP** and stops passing ARP broadcasts through to them. Boards with ESPHome `manual_ip` never DHCP, so after any reconnect nobody answers ARP for them: they associate fine and even announce themselves over mDNS, but are unreachable. **Pool Value Controls (.6, MAC `a4:cf:12:f1:6e:c8`) went dark 2026-10-09 11:04** at a Wi-Fi reconnect on AP .187 and then looped every 15 min on ESPHome's API `reboot_timeout`. Diagnosed by capture on .187: ARP who-has .6 reached the radio and got no reply, while a static neighbor entry made ping and API work at once. **Workaround (live):** systemd unit `static-arp-esphome.service` on .192 pins `.6 -> a4:cf:12:f1:6e:c8 nud permanent` on `enp0s31f6` (HA and ESPHome are bridge-networked on .192, so they use the host's neighbor table). **Real fix (pending, needs controller access on .150):** turn Proxy ARP off on the `ASUS_F0_2G` WLAN, OR switch the boards to DHCP + Firewalla reservations. Once Proxy ARP is off, `systemctl disable --now static-arp-esphome` on .192. A `power_save_mode: none` change was also OTA'd to the board (backup `pool-value-controls.yaml.bak-20261010-powersave`). It did NOT fix this, but it's harmless and was left in. **Any other static-IP Wi-Fi device on that SSID has the same problem.** **RESOLVED 2026-10-11:** Proxy ARP (and `ap_isolate`) were turned off on `ASUS_F0_2G` in the controller (pushed to all APs 11:09–11:18; the `proxy_arp`/`ap_isolate` lines are gone from every AP's hostapd config). `static-arp-esphome.service` was then disabled and deleted on .192. Verified afterwards: .6 resolves by normal ARP (neighbor `REACHABLE`, not `PERMANENT`), ping OK, HA API session established. If a static-IP Wi-Fi device goes dark again, check that Proxy ARP hasn't been switched back on. polelightpond (.14) and living_room_lights (.153) were still unreachable after the fix, so they have some other problem (unpowered or offline).
|
||
|
||
40. **Container version audit + upgrade round (2026-10-26)**. Upgraded: Synapse v1.163.2, MAS 1.27.1, Traefik v3.7 (3.7.16), node-exporter v1.12.1 (all 3 nodes), cadvisor v0.60.6, matrix-alertmanager-receiver 2026.9.23, Gitea 1.26.4 (patch only; pg_dump at `~/gitea-db-20261026-pre1264.dump` on .100), Jellyfin 12.3, Seerr v3.5.1, plus re-pulls of every moving tag on .192 (HA 2026.10.4, ESPHome, Mosquitto, Prometheus, Blackbox, Telegraf, nginx, litellm, and the postgres/mysql/redis patch images). Every compose file touched has a `.bak-20261026` next to it on the NAS. **Deliberately NOT done, each needs its own decision:** Onyx `:latest` now = **v5.0.0 (major, released 2026-10-24)**, still on v4.9.2 (no Watchtower on .192, so it only moves on a manual pull); Gitea 1.27.x / **28.x** (major jumps); OpenClaw 2026.7.1-2 -> 2026.10.7 (one-way state migration, see #30); hermes v2026.8.18 -> v0.22.5 (upstream switched to semver tags, and its LLM endpoint is dead anyway); **MySQL 8.0 (guacamole-db, semaphore-db) went EOL April 2026 -> needs an 8.4 LTS migration with a dump/restore**; InfluxDB 1.8 (EOL); Onyx's `postgres:15.2-alpine` (2023 patch level, managed by Onyx's compose); `awesometechnologies/synapse-admin` (stale, maintained fork is `etkecc/synapse-admin`). How to audit: compare each container's `RepoDigests` against registry HEAD digests -- for Docker Hub use the hub.docker.com web API (`/v2/namespaces/<ns>/repositories/<repo>/tags/<tag>` -> `digest`), which does not count against pull limits. `docker buildx imagetools inspect --format` is ignored by the nodes' buildx v0.31.1.
|
||
41. **Docker Hub anonymous pull limit is shared by the whole house** (public IP 98.160.103.126, 100 pulls/hour): on 2026-10-26 every node AND WSL got 429 `toomanyrequests`, meaning Watchtower updates of Docker Hub images were silently failing. Mitigation applied: both Watchtowers moved from a 24h poll interval to a **twice-daily cron schedule** (04:00/16:00), and the archived `containrrr/watchtower` swapped for the maintained drop-in fork `nickfedor/watchtower` (**image name is `nickfedor/`, not `nicholas-fedor/`** -- the latter is the GitHub org and 404s on Hub). Same env vars and still honors `com.centurylinklabs.watchtower.enable`. A `docker login` on the nodes would raise the limit further. **cadvisor no longer publishes to gcr.io** after v0.55 -- the image is now `ghcr.io/google/cadvisor`.
|
||
42. **node-exporter had been launched from `/tmp` (compose project `tmp`) on all 3 nodes**, so `docker compose` in the real dirs didn't own it. Fixed 2026-10-26: removed and redeployed from `/mnt/docker-data/compose/<node>/node-exporter/`. Separately, the **monitoring** compose on .192 still defines a legacy `node-exporter:latest` service on :9100 that a bare `docker compose up -d` would try to start; it is now gated behind `profiles: ["legacy-node-exporter"]`. Also: the matrix-alertmanager-receiver container is now named `monitoring-matrix-alertmanager-receiver-1` (compose default) -- Alertmanager reaches it by service name `matrix-alertmanager-receiver`, which still resolves.
|
||
43. **Farm Manager showed ZERO containers for hf-pdocker-01 (fixed 2026-10-26)**: the server fetches each agent's `/containers` with a timeout and on any error silently returns `[]` for that node. .192's agent took ~12s (47 containers, per-container `stats(stream=False)` = Docker samples twice ~1s apart, only 10 workers) vs a 10s timeout, so the main host's containers simply vanished from the dashboard while `/api/nodes` still said "healthy, 47". Fix: agent uses `stats(..., one_shot=True)` + 20 workers (now ~2s), server timeout 30s. Agent rebuilt on .192 and shipped to .100/bart via `docker save | docker load` (only .192 has the `/opt/farm-manager` source); rollback tags `farm-agent:rollback-20261026` / `farm-manager:rollback-20261026`. Same day: removed a dead `gpu-workstation` node (192.168.86.27) from the live `config.json`, made `/health` ignore Dead containers (bart reported 30 instead of 10), and rebuilt `groups.json` -- every group still used Swarm-era / decommissioned names (`ai-agents_margaret`, `jellyseerr`, `adguardhome`, bart Onyx, `openvas`, `unifi`...), so all group actions were no-ops. Now 14 groups / 63 containers; per-node utilities (farm-agent, node-exporter, telegraf, watchtower) are deliberately ungrouped so a group "stop" can't kill the agents. **4 tests in `tests/test_agent_docker_ops.py` fail -- pre-existing** (they mock `containers.list` but the code uses low-level `api.containers`); not caused by this change.
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